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First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds?  
USAID‟s Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa 
 






Abstract:  The United States government has adopted new approaches to counter violent 
extremist organizations around the world.  “Soft security” and development programs include 
focused educational training for groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, norm messaging 
through local radio programming, and job creation in rural communities.  This article evaluates 
the effectiveness of one set of these multi-vectored, community-level programs through analysis 
of data from 200 respondents in two similar, neighboring cities in northern Mali, Africa.  The 
data show that residents in Timbuktu who were exposed to the programming for up to five years 
displayed measurably altered civic behavior and listening patterns in comparison with their 
counterparts in the control city of Dire which had no programming (controlling for potential 
covariates including age, ethnicity, and political and socioeconomic conditions).  However, there 
was little measurable difference between the groups in terms of their cultural identities and 
attitudes towards the West.  This article suggests that the process of “winning hearts and minds” 





Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, decision makers in the U.S. 
government have stepped up their efforts to decrease the threats from violent extremist 
organizations (VEOs) such as Abu Sayyaf, Al Qaeda and its regional allies and affiliates 
(including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Shabab), 
Hamas, and Lashkar-e-Taiba.  Much of the funding for countering violent extremism has gone 
toward “kinetic” operations such as covert or battlefield operations, drone strikes, and the 
training of US-allied military forces in host nations.  Of the funds set aside for fighting the “war 
on terror” between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2012, only five percent has gone towards 
diplomacy and development programs of the State Department and United States Agency for 
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  Planners may rely on military responses because they 
remain familiar and allow quickly measurable outcomes.   
Nevertheless, many are beginning to recognize that they cannot, as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen publicly acknowledged, “kill our way to victory.”
2
 For 
example, while drone strikes may reduce the risks to US military personnel on the ground and 
remove VEO leaders from the battlefield, they simultaneously reinforce grievance narratives of 
such organizations and the “collateral damage” angers local populations and host governments 
alike.
3




Recently, the U.S. government has taken on broader strategy based on a diplomacy, 
development, and defense platform that seeks to incorporate a soft-side approach in the fight 
against violent extremism.
5
  As one decision maker argued, “[t]he way to undermine violent 
extremism is to give potential recruits…a viable alternative for which to live, not die.”
6
  
Strategies from the softer side include addressing alienation among marginalized groups, 
improving civil-military relations, and improving educational and vocational opportunities.
7
  
Observers may recognize this countering violent extremism (CVE) approach as an offshoot of 
the “soft power” approach advocated by the former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joe Nye 
which promoted co-optation rather than coercion as a lever for changing behaviors.
8
   
Where hard power relies on military strength and deterrence, soft power rests on 
credibility, trust, and shared norms.  Recognizing the multiple factors which can radicalize 
individuals and either push or pull them to join violent extremist organizations,
9
 the soft 
approach to counter-terrorism seeks to decrease the likelihood of recruitment and dry up the 
labor pool for potential terrorists.
10
  It does so through, among other methods, job provision, 
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vocational training, and information diffusion techniques. Employment growth may embed local 
residents into local networks and institutions and inoculate them against incentives from 
insurgent groups.  Stronger civic engagement ties locals into legitimate local governments and 
encourages them to support efforts to keep out violent extremist groups.  Similarly, radio 
programs on peace and tolerance can reduce intergroup tension and make violence less likely.  
USAID and the State Department began these new strategies in the early 2000s with a special 
focus on developing African nations with wide, ungoverned spaces and a large Muslim 
population.
11
   
U.S. planners show special interest in Africa because of its burgeoning youth population, 
persistent lack of educational, housing and vocational opportunities, long-simmering grievances 
among marginalized populations, and location on heavily-trafficked routes.
12
  Chad, Niger, 
Mauritania, Mali, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria serve as the main locations 
for the ongoing “battle of ideas”
13
 between VEO recruiters on one side local moderates, national 
governments, and United States partners on the other.
14
  Chief among the programs of the State 
Department and USAID has been the Pan Sahel Initiative (created in 2002) which became the 
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP, created in 2005); the Peace through 
Development (PDEV, started in 2008 and now operating as PDEV II) program has emerged 
from TSCTP.  Alongside these programs USAID has run a number of smaller-scale programs for 
countering violent extremism. 
In cooperation with host nation governments, local partners, and nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), USAID and the State Department have sought to improve governance, 
develop community resilience, and reduce the impact of VEO narratives on populations across 
Africa.  TSTCP – the largest of the programs focused on the often ungoverned spaces of northern 
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Africa – targets “youth empowerment, education, media, and good governance.”
15
  Mechanisms 
under TSCTP include micro-grants for schools and teacher training, funds for strengthening the 
capacity of local NGOs, youth development initiatives, and technical and content assistance for 
increasing information flow on issues of peace and tolerance.  Funding for these programs 
remains small in comparison with investments in military solutions; the USAID budget for 
TSCTP in fiscal year 2005 was roughly $5 million, increasing to $9 million by FY 2009,  with 
$16 million projected in the FY 2012 request.
16
  Despite the prominence of the soft side 
approach in the new U.S. strategy – as evidenced through the U.S. military‟s new Concept Plan 
7500 (CONPLAN 7500) which explicitly pushes development and diplomacy upstream and 
military force downstream
17
 – little is known about its actual effects on targeted populations.  
One recent overview of multiple studies found mixed-effects from development-based CVE 




This article seeks to measure the outcome of intensive US government activities in West 
Africa through a quasi-experimental paired-comparison study of 200 respondents from two 
similar towns in the nation of Mali.  While a military coup headed by Captain Amadou Sanogo 
overthrew Mali‟s elected president Amadou Toumani Toure in late March 2012 (and pro-junta 
protestors attacked interim leader Dioncounda Traore in late May 2012), the country had been a 
stable if weak and developing democracy since the early 1990s.  Mali, with more than 15 million 
people, remains among the poorer nations of the world
19
 and one in which a Tuareg separatist 
movement in the north has worried many observers who fear a potential alliance with al Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
20
  As a result of recent battles between the National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA, which formed in 2011) rebel group in northern Mali and 
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government forces, more than 320,000 people have fled their homes.  USAID has been carrying 
out a number of programs since 2005 in Mali focused on strengthening the resilience of local 
communities to the messages and inducements offered by violent extremist groups in the region 
such as AQIM. 
 Landlocked Mali presents a critical case study
21
 for illuminating the impact of CVE 
programming given its poverty, illiteracy, ungoverned spaces where the state has little capacity, 
and long-term internal conflicts.  Tuareg-led groups have sought independence for the north and 
has fought on and off against the central Malian government since 1960 (the end of French 
colonial rule).  Mali‟s colonial legacy and series of coups have created weakened political 
institutions and it has suffered from food insecurity.
22
   Further, the countering violent extremism 
programming in Mali has been experimental and less developed than in other nearby Sahel 
countries.
23
  Should the data from this study show that U.S. programs altered behaviors and 
attitudes under such difficult conditions, it would indicate a fortiori that these tactics would have 
an impact in more hospitable and stable locales.   
 This article makes several contributions to the literature.  First, “measuring and 
evaluating counter-terrorism policies” remains an understudied topic
24
 and “[t]he majority of the 
literature in the field comprises commentary and critique and lacks an empirical research 
basis.”
25
  One estimate based on the review of more than 100 articles found that less than 10 
percent used quantitative analysis to illuminate the outcomes of radicalization and de-
radicalization programs.
26
  Recognizing these broader gaps in the research field, this article seeks 
to provide a quantitative analysis of US government programming in Africa using new data from 
the field along with multiple analytical techniques.  The conclusions drawn by this paper are 
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based on a paired-comparison type quantitative field study undertaken in December 2010 using 
multiple approaches to analyze the data.   
Next, while many in the West are concerned about internet use by VEO recruiters, most 
of the population in the Sahel lacks access to the internet, and instead receives ideas via radio.  
Perhaps six percent of Africa‟s population has regular access to the internet, and studies have 
shown that more than 85 percent of Malians have never used it.
27
  Similarly, due to a lack of 
infrastructure, very few residents in Mali have regular access to electricity and thus television 
programming.  Although cell phone use is rising, phones themselves serve as conduits for radio 
programming, as even the base-model cell phones offered in Mali have FM radio receivers.
28
  
This study partially focuses on whether or not populations in Mali access existing CVE messages 
available to them through a more available medium: local radio stations.   
Finally, this study underscores that there is no “silver bullet” in reducing violent 
extremism.  Given the large number of tools available in the fields of public diplomacy, 
democracy promotion, and development, studies have yet to identify a single tactic which can 
work in all countries and cultures.  Instead, as this study emphasizes, strategies must be tailored 
to specific local communities based on cultural, linguistic, historical, and contextual factors
29
 and 
may have only partial effects on the target audience. 
This article first lays out the theories explaining what factors might drive behavioral and 
attitudinal changes, then explains the data used in the study and the methodologies used to 
analyze the data.  Beginning with bivariate, Chi-squared tested analyses, the paper moves on to 
multivariate regression techniques and propensity score matching to better support causal claims 
about the connections between variables of interest.  It discusses the results, sets out the next 
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This study sought to understand if several years of U.S. government-funded programs 
altered cognition and behaviors of Malians through a quasi-experiment involving 200 
respondents in the paired cities of Timbuktu and Dire.  Past experiments have used similar 
paired-village frameworks in which similar communities are studied to better understand the 
impact of policy interventions such as radio programming; in such field tests, one village or city 
receives the treatment (in this case, U.S. programs) while the other does not.
30
  The Trans-Sahara 
Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in Mali sought to increase civic participation, reduce 
inter-group tension and violence, and strengthen the resilience of vulnerable groups – such as 
young men – to recruitment by violent extremist organizations.  Strategic communication, such 
as messages broadcast through radio programming, can “help foster positive social networks, 
provide opportunities for individuals to gain respect and recognition, [and] increase the 
circulation of moderate voices and perspectives.”
31
  It focused its programming on Timbuktu and 
bypassed Dire. 
The core outcomes (dependent variables) of interest here are accessing peace and 
tolerance programs on local radio channels, participation in community-level decision making, 
perspectives on Al Qaeda‟s use of violence in the name of Islam, and beliefs in whether or not 
the U.S. is fighting Islam (or terrorism).   Policy planners hope that programs countering violent 
extremism will increase access to tolerance radio programming and civic participation, lead more 
residents to be critical of Al Qaeda‟s use of violence, and motivate people to see the United 
States as combatting terror, not Islam.  Successful outcomes would theoretically make young 
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Malian men less vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist organizations and more likely to 
remain embedded in positive, mainstream social and religious institutions.  Hence should the 
TSCTP-based programs in Timbuktu prove effective, residents there should demonstrate these 
behaviors more than their counterparts in Dire (who are not receiving such messages or 
benefiting from extensive U.S. government programs).  Research has shown that, beyond actual 
exposure to norm messaging and programming, a number of factors influence behaviors and 
attitudes: demographic factors, socioeconomic drivers, and intrinsic cultural attitudes.   
The study controls for demographic factors such as age, sex, and ethnicity. Scholars have 
long argued that sex strongly determines behavioral and cognitive outcomes, with some arguing 
that women and men display differences due to intrinsic biological factors and others arguing for 
the role of education and socialization.
32
  Whatever the reasons, analyses in Mali have shown 
broad differences between women and men in the areas of education, health care, governance, 
and economic growth,
33
 and thus controlling for sex is critical.  Another critical factor to take 
into account is age, as many attitudes develop through exposure, life experience, and education.
34
   
A third demographic variable of interest is ethnicity – in this project whether or not the 
respondents in this area of northern Mali were Sonrai (also spelled Songhay, who traditionally 
were farmers) or Tuareg (who worked as herders).  Ethnicity can strongly condition expectations 
about state and local population assistance based on levels of support or marginalization. Mali‟s 
long-simmering Tuareg rebellion has been fueled by the belief among many Tuareg that the 
government has failed to follow through on past promises and deliver needed services to their 
communities.  Indeed, USAID researchers noted more than a decade ago that “[d]ue to the harsh 
climate, the lack of natural resources, high transport costs, a high illiteracy rate, and the nomadic 
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lifestyle of many of its inhabitants, the North, and particularly the Tuareg population, has not 
received an equitable portion of governmental resources.”
35
 
Socioeconomic and political conditions also impact norms and behaviors.  The survey 
included questions about belief in political freedom, satisfaction with services in the community, 
contact with local political representatives, the imagined likelihood of a local council member 
listening to concerns, and the degree of efficacy that the respondent reported.  These variables 
capture the perspectives of the respondents about their financial conditions and the political 
environments in which they live.  Individuals less satisfied with the services that they receive 
from government officials or local government employees may be more likely to ignore 
moderating norm messages and instead seek out assistance from violent extremist groups.  
Similarly, marginalized Malians who see themselves as having less efficacy – that is, lack the 
ability to alter their political environment – may not seek to support the existing government, 
ignoring it or, ultimately, seeking to undermine it. 
This study also includes a number of potential cultural drivers of behavior and attitudes, 
including impressions of the northern rebellion, views of the United States, support or opposition 
for the implementation of sharia (Islamic religious) law, and support or opposition for the use of 
violence in the name of Islam.  Those who hold negative views of the U.S., support the 
implementation of Islamic religious law in a democratic state, and support violence in the name 
of Islam may be less likely to seek out messages of tolerance and peace and similarly less likely 
to become civically engaged.  By including these characteristics as potential controls, the study 
disentangles potentially overlapping or highly correlated perspectives. 
The core treatment / control variable (operationalized as a dummy) is whether or not 
residents were directly or indirectly exposed to five years of U.S. government programming 
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which sought to encourage them to tune into radio programming on peace and tolerance, 
mobilize them to participate in community decision making, and view VEO behavior negatively.  
U.S. government programs for the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in the 
city of Timbuktu were run by a variety of partners over the period 2005-2010.
36
  Thousands of 
Timbuktu‟s residents, exposed to a broad array of messages through educational, governance, 
and financial programs, were encouraged to tune into the peace and harmony radio programs run 
by local stations in local languages.  Educational, norm messaging, and radio programs reached a 
broad population in Timbuktu.
37
  For example, USAID helped provide new radio equipment, 
two-way communications radio, and training to multiple Timbuktu community radio stations.  
Regionally, teaching training programs broadcast over this network reached 1403 teachers in 217 
schools in the area.
38
   On average, at least 600 students would have benefitted from USAID 
sponsored educational programming per year.
39
   
Beyond the Timbuktu residents who directly interacted with United States programming, 
past studies have shown how social networks rapidly transmit ideas throughout their members 
even in poor, underdeveloped rural areas.
40
  Given the strong interdependence of ideas within 
geographically-defined communities, even weak ties (Granovetter 1973) between individuals in 
the network can spread new behaviors and attitudes through social learning and social 
influence.
41
  Research on Malian social networks, for example, confirmed that they influenced 
individual decisions about critical health issues such as contraception.
42
  Members in a 
community receive information about ideas and innovation – such as solving conflicts using 
mediation, and not violence – from their friends, acquaintances, and family who already engage 
in such behavior and promote it through their connections.  In short, a large percentage of 
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Timbuktu residents were exposed to new norms both directly (through participation in US 
government programs) and indirectly (through their social networks).   
Dire, in contrast, had little or no such U.S. government-sponsored programming over the 
2005-2010 period, but radio tests in the area showed that local radios in Dire could pick up 
USAID-supported shows on issues of peace and tolerance from other, nearby locations.  More 
than half of Malians rely on local radio as their primary source of trusted news and that the 
content often revolves around entertainment.  Residents of both cities had the capacity, but not 
necessarily the motivation, to tune into programming which encouraged peaceful negotiations 
and nonviolent communication.  Individuals in Timbuktu directly interacted with US government 
programming in schools, workshops, and indirectly through their social networks, while Dire 




The study utilizes data collected through a 14-question survey in mid-December 2010 in 
the cities of Timbuktu and Dire administered to 200 respondents in local languages by the 
Association Malienne pour la Survie au Sahel (Malian Association for the Management of the 
Sahel, AMSS).
43
   The survey questions were structured as Likert-responses with scales from 1 
to 5 for each answer, with 5 set as outcomes most favorable to the United States.  Respondents 
within these cities were chosen at random from the broader population by surveyors visiting the 
community on foot; after knocking on doors, they identified themselves as surveyors seeking out 
the opinions of local residents and, if admitted, administer the survey.  For security reasons and 
to avoid possible bias they did not identify themselves as contractors of the United States 
government.  Figure 1 below provides a map of the two cities under study, which sit side by side 




[Figure 1 here] 
 
The cities for the study were chosen deliberately, not randomly, through a paired 
comparison approach to data analysis.
44
  Dire, the administrative center of the Diré Cercle, is a 
town and commune on the left bank of the Niger River in the Timbuktu Region of Mali. In 2009 
its population was 22,365.   Timbuktu, capital of the region of Timbuktu, has a larger population, 
closer to 54,000, but shares many of the demographic, civic participation, and gender 
characteristics of Dire.   Table 1 below provides a comparison between the two cities. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, both cities have Islam as their core religion and have mostly balanced sex 
ratios (that is, roughly equal numbers of women and men).  While Dire has a smaller population 
than Timbuktu and has had a slighter smaller population growth rate over the past few years, it 
has higher rankings on several critical socioeconomic indicators, including voter turnout and 
poverty levels.  Both also have similar levels of primary and secondary schooling, and both of 
these cities sit in an area of Mali with primary school attendance “well below the national 
average (between 26 percent and 31 percent)” (Nikolic 2007: 24).  Roughly 1/3 of Malians have 
received no formal schooling, and only 5 percent have completed university.  It is important to 
recognize the strong demographic, religious, and socioeconomic similarities between the two 
neighbor cities; with such parallel conditions, any differences in cognitive and behavioral 




Table 2 below provides descriptive statistics about the variables captured through the 
interviews; notice the regular variation of more than 1 point on the 5-point scale for these 
questions.   
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The population captured through polling includes women and men from early to late adulthood 
(no one under 18 was interviewed) and showed diversity in its socioeconomic, political, and 
cultural perspectives. By and large respondents believed that the northern rebellion was not 
justified (with 1 being justified, and 5 being unjustified, the mean was 4.35), that the Malian 
government should work with the West to fight terrorism (a mean of 4.44, with 1 indicating 
disagreement and 5 indicating agreement), and some interest in instituting Islamic law (with a 
mean of 2.9, and 1 indicating support and 5 indicating a lack of support).  There was broad 





The first step in analyzing the data uses a bivariate approach to see if there are any 
noticeable connections between exposure (and lack thereof) to the U.S. programming and 
outcomes of the key variables of interest.  Cross tabulation with Chi-squared distribution tests of 
the treatment and control groups show a strong connection between exposure and listening to 
radio programs about peace and tolerance.  Figure 2 below maps out the raw data from the polls 
into box-and-whisker graphs, with the line in the center of the box indicating the mean value, the 









[Figure 2 here] 
 
Notice that the difference between the responses of the two groups has a Chi-squared 
(probability value) of .017, meaning that there is a very strong connection between the location 
of the respondent in Timbuktu or Dire and his or her listening behaviors.  The next outcome of 
interest, participation in decision making in the community, is illustrated through Figure 3 below. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The Chi-squared P value for this relationship is .002, again indicating a strong correlation 
between location and civic engagement.  In contrast to the clear distinction in answers to 
questions about civic engagement and peace and tolerance program listening between Malians 
living in Timbuktu and Dire, bivariate tests of the other two outcomes of interest showed no 
measurable difference.  The Chi-squared value for the answers to the question, “Is the U.S. 
fighting Islam or terror?” was .397 (indicating no strong divisions by control or treatment) while 
the answers for “Are Al Qaeda‟s activities justified under Islamic law?” had a value of .743 
(again indicating little difference between the two groups).  (I omit the graphs of these two 
outcomes for space considerations.)  These initial analyses indicate the presence of a strong 
relationship for two of the four outcomes of interest, but these bivariate approaches have not 
attempted to control for confounding factors.   
The next stage of analysis uses an ordered probit (oprobit) regression to control for 
various other factors, such as age, sex, demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural characteristics 
in illuminating potential relationships between the control/treatment groups and outcomes of 
interest.  An ordered probit model is more appropriate here than a standard regression model 
because the outcomes of interest are limited, ordinal dependent variables (with a ranking from 
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one to five), while regressions assume continuous structures for outcomes.  It is important to 
recognize that coefficient outputs of the ordered probit model cannot be interpreted in the same 
way as a regression model given the cut-points assumed by the analysis.  Here, we focus on the P 
value for the treatment/control – should the P value sit at .05 or lower, it indicates a 95 percent 
probability that the relationship between this variable and the outcome is not due to randomness. 
Table 2 demonstrates the outcomes of the oprobit model using the 16 independent 
variables captured by the poll to illustrate their relationship with the outcome of listening to 
peace and tolerance radio.  Notice that for almost all of the variables, while the coefficients 
indicate some effect on the outcome, those coefficients are not statistically significant.  The only 
independent variable with a statistically significant effect on the outcome of listening to such 
radio programs is whether or not respondents were in the control or treatment groups. 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Table 3 below shows the relationship between those variables and the outcome of 
participating in local decision making processes.   Here, several dependent variables show up as 
statistically significant, including satisfaction with services, belief that the local councilor will 
listen, opinion about the United States, and age.  But notice again that the variable of being in 
either Timbuktu or Dire has an effect almost as strong or stronger than the other variables, and its 
coefficient is statistically significant (with a P value of .034). 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
For the other two outcomes of interest, however, being in Timbuktu or Dire had no measurable 
impact; for justifying Al Qaeda‟s activities under Islam, the P value for treatment/control was 
.520 (far above the cut-off of .05) and for the U.S. fighting Islam or terror, it was .298 (again, not 
statistically significant).   
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At this point the analysis has demonstrated that even controlling for confounding factors, 
being in the treatment or control group has a strong and significant correlation with civic 
engagement and listening to peace radio, but not with justifying Al Qaeda‟s behavior under 
Islam or on the question of whether the US is fighting terrorism or Islam.  It is difficult to make a 
causal claim that exposure to U.S. programming leads to increased local participation and radio 
listening based solely on regression analysis results, however.  To make a stronger claim requires 
re-ordering the data through propensity matching techniques to better resemble a twins-study 
type structure so that the treatment and control groups are alike in as many ways as possible. 
Propensity matching takes an existing dataset and processes it, removing unlike 
observations to make the treatment and control groups as balanced and similar as possible.
45
  In 
the same way that medical experiments often use twins who are alike in as many ways as 
possible – genetically and environmentally, for example, for twins raised in the same household 
– propensity score matching drops observations that are not on common support (that is, sit 
within the same range of the propensity score) and seeks to create a smaller and more 
comparable dataset.  Doing so changes an observational dataset under quasi-experimental 
conditions closer to actual experimental conditions, hoping to reduce bias in the observations of 
treatment effects.  Here, I used nearest-neighbor matching with replacement to create the new 
dataset and then measured the average treatment effect (ATE) for the four outcomes of interest.  
The average treatment effect here is the difference in the means between the outcomes of 
treatment (Timbuktu) and control (Dire) groups. 
Figure 4 below displays the new, matched dataset in histogram form along the propensity 
score axis, comparing the treated and untreated (i.e. from Timbuktu or Dire) data along with 
whether or not the data were similar enough to be comparable (on common support).
46
  Note that 
17 
 
the values at the ends of the propensity score spectrum were, by and large, off common support, 
and therefore not used to calculate the average treatment effect. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
Table 4 below shows the average treatment effects for the four outcomes of interest (matching 
for the other covariates identified previously in the regression analysis) and displays the P value 
along with the 95 percent confidence interval around the estimated coefficients. 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The first two outcomes of interest have P values for their average treatment effects under the cut-
off of .05, indicating that those values are statistically significant (this outcome is also visible in 
the 95 percent confidence intervals for these ATEs which rest entirely above zero).  We see that 
in both cases, Malians in Timbuktu were roughly 40 percent more likely to listen to peace and 
radio programming and participate in local government activities than their similar counterparts 
in Dire.  In contrast, the last two outcomes of interest had P values well above the statistical cut-
off – meaning that the results are not statistically significant, and that there were no observable 
differences between the two. 
 
Discussion and Next Steps 
 
Bivariate analysis indicated a relationship between the responses of the Malians in two of 
the four outcomes of interest based on their exposure to multivectored U.S. programing.  
Similarly, ordered probit (oprobit) regressions showed strong differences between the two cities 
holding other variables constant for the variables of participation in local decision making and 
listening to the peace and tolerance radio programming.  Just as with the bivariate analyses, the 
regressions found no measurable differences between the two in the “higher level” answers of 
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whether the US is fighting Islam or terrorism and whether or not Al Qaeda‟s use of violence was 
justified under Islamic law.  Finally, propensity score matching analysis indicated that Malians 
living in the city of Timbuktu were 40 percent more likely to listen to peace radio and 40 percent 
more likely to be civically engaged than their similar counterparts in Dire.  The same technique 
showed no measurable difference between the two communities in terms of their higher level 
perspectives on justification under Islam for Al Qaeda‟s use of violence or whether the U.S. is 
fighting Islam or terror. 
Geographical proximity and highly similar background conditions between the treatment 
and control group help keep constant many unobserved correlates  This paired city comparison – 
with very similar economic, demographic, and religious conditions in these neighboring 
communities – allows us to point toward U.S. programming as the core factor behind these 
different outcomes.   Further, as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) have argued, propensity score 
matching allows us to make stronger claims about the causal relationships between variables, as 
the technique is not based on correlation (which could flow causally in either direction) and 
instead simply measures the differences in outcomes between the two, highly similar groups.  
Thanks to propensity score matching outcomes, we can be very certain that the targeted 
respondents in Timbuktu had measurably different cognitive and attitudinal outcomes on two of 
the four outcomes of interest than their counterparts in Dire.  Consistent results across three types 
of methodological analyses demonstrate that U.S. countering violent extremism programs such 
as TSCTP have had measurable, if limited, results. 
However, the selection of paired cities was not randomized and there is no direct way to 
link individual respondents to the U.S.-sponsored programs which may have influenced their 
behaviors and cognitions (as this data was not collected by the survey teams).  As mentioned 
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previously, this study relies on the large amount of direct exposure to US programs among the 
Timbuktu population in combination with indirect exposure through second- and third-level 
social influence.  Based on these initial results, scholars and policy makers should work to create 
stronger evidence about the impact of multi-vectored programming through three improvements.   
First, future studies should use a larger number of observations linked directly to program 
exposure to ensure that the captured responses are representative of the larger universe of 
individuals in country.  While 200 respondents provides a robust sample on which to draw, 
ongoing polling in Africa by the Department of Defense‟s AFRICOM affiliated contractors 
regularly poll 2000 or more residents.  USAID, the State Department, and scholars interested in 
the effectiveness of U.S. government programming should invest additional resources in such 
field studies.  Next, the best field studies have used completely randomized studies to better 
ensure a lack of bias.
47
  Due to resource constraints and security concerns, this study used two 
contiguous, very similar towns which had very different levels of U.S. government 
programming, but future studies could use more stochastic-based heuristics in selecting field 
sites.   
Finally, rather than relying on a side-by-side comparison alone, future studies should 
undertake a longitudinal study of interventions, beginning with baseline measurements in both 
the control and treatment communities and moving on to confirm individual-level exposure to 
relevant messages.  By establishing baseline parameters in the treatment and control 
communities, the study could be structured along a “difference-in-difference” framework which 









Given that military solutions are not sufficient to end violent extremism, and that “an 
insurgency cannot be eradicated by force alone”,
48
 it is critical that academics, NGOs, and aid 
agencies work to develop “usable knowledge” about soft-side CVE policies.  Such knowledge is 
both accurate and politically tractable.
49
  This article has sought to advance our understanding of 
the power of multitrack, developmental USAID programming against violent extremism in 
Africa.  It found strong evidence that the residents of the city of Timbuktu exposed to five years 
of U.S. sponsored programs had different cognitive and behavioral outcomes than their similar 
neighbors in Dire in two of the four areas of interest.  Timbuktu residents were far more likely to 
listen to peace and tolerance radio and to take part in civic activities, but showed little difference 
terms of their beliefs about the U.S. fighting terror or Islam and Islamic justification for Al 
Qaeda‟s activities.  These results confirm the results of other field experiments in Africa that 
programs such as reconciliation, peace, and tolerance radio may not change higher-level, abstract 
beliefs but can alter both norms and behavior.
50
   
Studies in Chad and Niger illustrated that “radio programming stands out as a significant 
success story, well accepted – even beloved in many communities –and it has the broadest 
reach.”
51
  Given that community radio “can be a particularly cost-effective medium with a 
significant reach,”
52
 policy makers should invest in ways to get people to tune in more often to 
specific types of programming.  According to the Media Sustainability Index, Mali, for example, 
has more than 250 FM radio stations throughout the country and that much of the programming 
currently tends toward lighter, entertainment-based issues.
53
  Radio programming which 
encourages inter-ethnic cooperation and nonviolence – such as that being used in Rwanda post-
21 
 
genocide to bridge gaps between Hutus and Tutsis- should become the baseline for future CVE 
toolkits in countries around the world. 
Given the effectiveness of radio programming, policy makers should consider further 
investing in complementary programs which bring expand listening audiences and use norm 
messaging techniques to alter behaviors and attitudes.  While radio programming itself is 
relatively inexpensive – training local residents to work as journalists and producers, setting up 
the physical infrastructure, and distributing hand-cranked or solar radios require small scale 
investments – the interventions which build up listeners are, by contrast, somewhat expensive.  
Distributing micro grants, strengthening educational and NGO infrastructure, and creating new 
industries requires extensive knowledge of local social structures, languages, and customs.  U.S. 
planners should be prepared for long term engagements in communities of interest, and this may 
be a challenge for politicians and political appointees in the civil service often responding to 
short term electoral pressures. 
Some have called Africa‟s current youth bulge the “cheetah generation” in that they are 
hungry for knowledge and opportunities while the elder generations – criticized as “hippos” – 
move more slowly to embrace change and have less autonomy to deviate from tradition.
54
  The 
cheetahs have embraced social media, and their numbers – 450 million and rising – indicate that 
future programs will need to reorient to include them and their methods of information gathering.  
In a decade, it may be that NGOs and aid agencies will move from radios to other, internet-based 
platforms for norm messaging.  As the United States and other developed nations seek to 
influence the developing world away from the destructive messages and recruitment attempts of 
violent extremist organizations, policy makers should ensure that their solutions are grounded in 
local languages, cultures, and institutions.   USAID‟s work in Mali and the Sahel may show that 
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Able to meet basic 






Timbuktu 54453 5.7 48.74 21.3 8.5 48 72.3 100
Dire 22365 4.7 56.14 27.3 9.1 50 81.8 100  
Note: Population and growth rate data from Resultats Provisoires RGPH, République de Mali, Institut National de la 
Statistique 2009; voter turnout from Ministere de L'Administration Republique du Mali Territoriale et des 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Free to join political organizations 200 4.62 0.71 2.00 5.00 
Satisfaction with services 200 3.37 0.96 1.00 5.00 
Participation in decision making 199 3.28 1.32 1.00 5.00 
Contact with representatives 200 2.76 1.65 1.00 5.00 
Likelihood of Councilor listening 200 3.37 1.02 1.00 5.00 
Efficacy 200 4.11 1.00 1.00 5.00 
Is the rebellion justified  200 4.35 1.27 1.00 5.00 
Listen to tolerance and peace radio programs 200 3.98 1.07 1.00 5.00 
Opinion on the US 200 3.91 0.96 1.00 5.00 
Should Mali work with West to fight terrorism 200 4.44 1.20 1.00 5.00 
Is violence in name of Islam justified 200 4.44 1.11 1.00 5.00 
Are Al Qaeda's activities justified 200 4.44 1.13 1.00 5.00 
Support implementing Sharia 200 2.91 1.86 1.00 5.00 
Is the US fighting terror or Islam 200 4.66 0.88 1.00 5.00 
Gender 200 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Ethnicity 200 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Age Group 200 3.29 1.48 1.00 5.00 
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Ordered Probit Regression: Dependent 






z P>z Low CI 
High 
CI 
Free to join political organizations 0.057 0.113 0.500 0.615 -0.165 0.278 
Satisfaction with services 0.064 0.112 0.570 0.568 -0.155 0.282 
Participation in decision making 0.085 0.079 1.060 0.288 -0.071 0.240 
Contact with representatives -0.017 0.053 -0.320 0.746 -0.120 0.086 
Likelihood of Councilor listening 0.009 0.085 0.100 0.919 -0.158 0.176 
Efficacy -0.122 0.090 -1.360 0.173 -0.299 0.054 
Is the rebellion justified or not 0.031 0.068 0.470 0.642 -0.101 0.164 
Opinion on the US 0.121 0.092 1.300 0.192 -0.061 0.302 
Should Mali work with West to fight 
terrorism? 
-0.052 0.070 -0.740 0.456 -0.189 0.085 
Is violence in name of Islam justified? -0.006 0.087 -0.060 0.948 -0.176 0.165 
Are Al Qaeda's activities justified? -0.037 0.069 -0.530 0.595 -0.173 0.099 
Support implementing Sharia -0.002 0.053 -0.030 0.973 -0.105 0.102 
Is the US fighting terror or Islam? 0.034 0.088 0.390 0.694 -0.137 0.206 
Gender -0.255 0.181 -1.410 0.159 -0.610 0.100 
Age Group -0.024 0.058 -0.410 0.685 -0.137 0.090 
Treatment / Control dummy 0.448 0.167 2.690 0.007 0.121 0.775 


























Ordered Probit Regression: Dependent 






z P>z Low CI 
High 
CI 
Free to join political organizations 0.042 0.110 0.380 0.701 -0.173 0.257 
Satisfaction with services 0.523 0.118 4.420 0.000 0.291 0.755 
Contact with representatives 0.106 0.055 1.930 0.053 -0.002 0.214 
Likelihood of Councilor listening 0.202 0.082 2.460 0.014 0.041 0.362 
Efficacy -0.034 0.097 -0.350 0.729 -0.223 0.156 
Is the rebellion justified or not -0.063 0.075 -0.830 0.404 -0.210 0.085 
Opinion on the US 0.290 0.104 2.790 0.005 0.087 0.494 
Should Mali work with West to fight 
terrorism? 
-0.081 0.086 -0.930 0.350 -0.249 0.088 
Is violence in name of Islam justified? 0.084 0.095 0.890 0.373 -0.101 0.269 
Are Al Qaeda's activities justified? 0.017 0.061 0.270 0.785 -0.103 0.137 
Support implementing Sharia -0.002 0.048 -0.040 0.967 -0.097 0.092 
Is the US fighting terror or Islam? -0.249 0.110 -2.260 0.024 -0.465 -0.033 
Gender -0.104 0.168 -0.620 0.537 -0.434 0.226 
Age (grouped) 0.180 0.060 3.000 0.003 0.062 0.297 
Control 0.371 0.172 2.160 0.031 0.034 0.708 
/cut1 1.937 0.988   0.001 3.873   
/cut2 2.594 0.991   0.651 4.537   
/cut3 3.242 0.997   1.287 5.196   




Figure 4: Example of Evaluation of Balance for Matching 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
Propensity Score
Untreated: Off support Untreated: On support




Table 4: Matching Outcomes for Four Quantities of Interest 










Listen to peace and tolerance 0.43 0.19 2.25 0.02 0.06 0.80 
Participate in decision making 0.40 0.18 2.25 0.03 0.05 0.76 
U.S. fighting terrorism or 
Islam 
-0.02 0.13 -0.15 0.88 -0.28 0.24 
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